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LAMPF v. GILBERTSON: RULE 10b-5's
TIME HAS COME
I. INTRODUCTION
Individuals accused of violating Rule lOb-5, promulgated under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act), have faced substantial un-
certainty in determining the applicable statute of limitations.' Since
1946, circuit courts have looked to different provisions of state law to
borrow limitation periods because section l0b of the 1934 Act does not
articulate such a period.2 These periods ranged from one to six years
depending upon the state and source of the applicable limitation pe-
riod.3 In addition to states having different statute of limitations for the
same action, courts have added to the confusion by borrowing limitation
periods from different causes of action within each state. The area,
therefore, lacked uniformity, predictability and a semblance of justice.
The United States Supreme Court recently provided a uniform, fed-
eral limitation period in Lampf v. Gilbertson.4 The Court held the "one
year from discovery, three years from the event" statute of limitations,
derived from other sections of the 1934 Act, applied to all private Rule
10b-5 actions. 5 In doing so, the Court rejected the traditional practice
of borrowing a statute of limitations from an analogous state cause of
action. The majority also rejected an argument by the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) to adopt a five-year limit of repose from
the recently enacted Insider Trading Act.
6
This Comment will survey the Rule lOb-5 statute of limitation prob-
lem which gave rise to the Lampf decision. The Comment will provide a
foundation to understanding the Court's decision through the Court's
increasing practice of borrowing from federal analogies, and a review of
1. Rule lOb-5, promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission reads:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1991).
2. See infra notes 21-36 and accompanying text. For a discussion and breakdown of
the limitation period applied by each Circuit, see James Beasley, Committee on Federal Regu-
lation of Securities Report of the Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 Bus.
LAw. 645 (1986) [hereinafter "Task Force"].
3. See Roberts v. Magnetic Metals Co., 611 F.2d 450 (3d Cir. 1979) (applying New
Jersey's six year statute for common law fraud); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915
(4th Cir. 1976) (applying Maryland's one-year Blue Sky statute).
4. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
5. Id. at 2782.
6. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-l(a) and (b)(4) (1988).
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the circuit courts' treatment of the problem. The Comment's analysis
will focus on the ramifications of adopting the one-year/three-year limi-
tation period and the Court's retroactive application of that decision.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Traditional Statute Selection
Statutes of limitations provide the judicial system with a means of
limiting claims, which are impractical or inequitable to adjudicate due to
the passage of time. 7 Generally, a legislature will either prescribe a limi-
tation period for a newly enacted cause of action or simply apply a
state's catchall statute. An implied cause of action, because of its very
nature, has no prescribed limitation period.8 Traditionally, federal
courts have adopted a limitation period from an "analogous" state pro-
vision when no expressed limitation period is provided.9 Since Kardon v.
National Gypsum Co., where a federal district court determined a private
cause of action existed under Rule lOb-5,10 the circuits have adopted
limitation periods from a variety of state provisions. 1 1
A court presiding over a Rule lOb-5 action faced a problem in de-
termining which state-created cause of action was most analogous to the
Rule lOb-5 claim. 12 The federal circuits found a variety of state actions
7. "[S]tatutes of limitation ... protect the interests of three groups: potential de-
fendants, the courts, and society in general.... A party does not have to defend itself after
long periods of time, when evidence or witnesses may no longer be available." Neil Sobol,
Determining Limitations Periods For Actions Arising Under Federal Statutes, 41 Sw. LJ. 895, 897
(1987) [hereinafter Sobol]. "Temporal limitations, especially those of certain duration,
assure potential defendants that they will not be forced to live indefinitely with the threat
of a lawsuit." See Note, Limitation Borrowing in Federal Courts, 77 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1128
(1979) (citations omitted) [hereinafter Note].
8. The adoption of a limitation period from an analogous state law is acceptable
because "[w]hen Congress has not established a time limitation for a federal cause of ac-
tion, the settled practice has been to adopt a local time limitation as federal law if it is not
inconsistent with federal law or policy to do so." Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-67
(1985). For a general discussion on the purpose of limiting actions, see Sobel, supra note
7.
9. Applying state limitation periods has been a time honored practice of the federal
court system. See M'Cluny v. Sillman, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 270 (1830).
10. Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513 (E.D. Pa. 1946). The dis-
trict court in Kardon based its decision that a private 10b-5 action existed on the common
law approach that "[tihe disregard of the command of a statute is a wrongful act and a
tort." Id.
11. See Bath v. Bushkin, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990) (applying limitation period for
common law fraud); Smith v. Duff and Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567 (11 th Cir. 1990) (apply-
ing limitation period from forum state's Blue Sky statute).
Blue Sky statutes are acts which regulate security transactions on a state level. The
term "Blue Sky" originated in Kansas, which enacted the first effective securities statute.
The statute and term are based on preventing promoters from promising only blue skies
and rosy outcomes. See generally, Louis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION, 8
(1988) (hereinafter Loss).
Congress's numerous revisions of federal securities law have done little in providing
further guidance, adding nothing concerning the private cause of action or an applicable
statute of limitations for lOb-5 actions. Congress added the regulation of tender offers to
the Act in 1968 and substantially broadened the regulation of the securities markets in
1975. See generally, supra, Loss, ch. 1.
12. "If Congress has not specified an applicable limitation period, the court must ex-
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analogous. The First Circuit looked to personal tort actions.13 Others
focused on a state's Blue Sky limitation period. 14 Still others applied
the state's common law fraud limitation period. 15 Some circuits, how-
ever, failed to consistently borrow the same state-created action-from
within each state, creating further inequities and confusion.
The circuits that adopted a state's fraud limitation period rational-
ized that Rule lOb-5 was enacted to facilitate prosecution of complex
fraudulent securities transactions. 16 Securities laws, however, supple-
ment, not supplant common law fraud actions. These circuits also em-
phasized that both actions have analogous proof requirements. Time
constraints weighed heavily as another factor in favor of adopting a com-
mon law fraud limitation period. State legislatures generally provide a
longer limitations period for fraud actions than for violations of securi-
ties laws. Courts viewed the extended period as being in line with Con-
gress's intent of providing the aggrieved investor with an adequate
remedy.
Several circuits applied limitation periods of a state's Blue Sky or
securities statute. These also were troublesome, although they may ini-
tially appear most analogous to Rule lOb-5, as significant distinctions
exist, including: (1) shorter limitation periods than those for common
law fraud; (2) failure to encompass all of the relief available under Rule
lOb-5 or the state's common law; 17 (3) failing to provide for equitable
tolling to prevent an undiscovered claims from being time barred;' 8 and
(4) not requiring proof of scienter thus warranting a shorter limitation
amine the nature of the cause of action to determine the time restriction." Holmberg v.
Armbrecht, 327 U.S. 392, 395 (1946).
13. Maggio v. Gerard Freezer & Ice Co., 824 F.2d 123 (Ist Cir. 1987) (applying a
three-year limitation period and barring a thirteen-year-old action).
14. Cf Smith v. Duff& Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567 (lth Cir. 1990) (rejecting federal
analogy and applying Alabama's two-year limitation period); Herm v. Stafford, 663 F.2d
669 (6th Cir. 1981) (applying both a one-year securities limitation period and an amended
three-year period to different lOb-5 claims); O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir.
1980) (applying Maryland's securities tolling provision and one-year limitation period).
15. Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1990) (rejecting federal analogy and ap-
plying equitable tolling to Oregon's two-year fraud limitation period); Sioux Ltd. Sec. Liti-
gation v. Coopers & Lybrand, 914 F.2d 61 (5th Cir. 1990) (applying Texas' newly enacted
four-year fraud limitation period rather than two-year period in force at time of trial);
Harris v. Union Elec. Co., 787 F.2d 355 (8th Cir. 1986) (applying Missouri's two-year
fraud limitation period).
16. "The common-law fraud action was inadequate for the sophisticated transactions
involving insider trading and market manipulation." CarlosJ. Cuevas, The Misappropriation
Theory and Rule 10b-5: Deadlock in the Supreme Court, 13 J. CORP. LAw 793, 795 (1988).
"Thus, common-law actions in fraud or deceit failed to provide adequate protection for
stockholders from individuals who traded on the market exchange based upon privileged
access to corporate information. Due to the continued development of the impersonal
market exchange, Congress sought to provide investor protection ...." Dana L. Hegarty,
Rule lOb-5 and the Evolution of Common-law Fraud-The Need for an Effective Statutory Proscription
ofInsider Trading by Outsiders, 22 SUFFOLK U.L. REv. 813, 815 (1988).
17. See Biggans v. Bache Halsley Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605, 610 (3d Cir. 1980)
(holding that where a Blue Sky statute does not provide the relief prayed for the statute of
limitations from the common law action will prevail).
18. Aldrich v. McCulloch Properties, Inc., 627 F.2d 1036 (10th Cir. 1980).
1992]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW
period. 19 This last distinction presented problems as, in 1976, the
United States Supreme Court held the scienter requirement applied to
Rule lOb-5 actions.
20
B. The Rule lOb-5 Problem
When a Rule lOb-5 claim accrues, the injured party must decide
when and where to file a lawsuit. In the past, this has invited forum
shopping because the statute of limitations applied to the particular ac-
tion may have been longer in one jurisdiction than in another. Courts in
Rule lOb-5 actions could do little to hinder this practice since the courts
created the problem.
The disparity created by applying different limitation periods to
Rule 1 Ob-5 claims led both plaintiffs and defendants into a litigious mine
field. 2 1 A Rule lOb-5 claim could be held time barred in one state or
circuit and be found valid in another. This inequity in procedural pro-
cess ran contrary to the universal belief that each individual should have
the opportunity to play the game under the same set of rules.
The following two cases arising out of Pennsylvania in 1982 vividly
illustrate the confusion in this area of law. In Ging v. Parker-Hunter,
Inc. ,22 a group of investors brought an action under Rule lOb-5 alleging
securities fraud. The securities dealer moved for summary judgment as-
serting that the claims were time barred under the Pennsylvania Securi-
ties Acts' ("PSA") two-year statute of limitations.23 In addressing the
limitations issue, the court focused on the remedy provided by the state
statute rather than the elements of the offense. The court reasoned that
the state fraud statute, not the PSA, provided investors with the remedy
requested, 24 adopted the six-year limitation period for common law
fraud, and held the claim was not time barred. 25 The PSA also differed
from Rule lOb-5 by requiring privity.
In Fickinger v. C.L Planning Corp.,26 decided in 1982, six months after
Ging, the plaintiffs brought a class action against a real estate investment
trust, its advisor and the parent company. The plaintiffs maintained the
statute of limitations for fraud applied. The court agreed, finding that
common law fraud would be the only remedy provided under state
law. 2 7 The defendant then argued that the two-year limitation period
for fraud applied, while the plaintiffs contended that the six-year catch-
19. Diamond v. Lamotte, 709 F.2d 1419 (1Ith Cir. 1983); Biggins v. Bache Halsey
Stuart Shields, Inc., 638 F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980).
20. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
21. "A good illustration of the difficulties that can come up under either the passive or
the active approach to borrowing state statutes of limitations is the problem of limitations
for SEC Rule I Ob-5 securities actions, presently one of the more confused areas of federal
law." Sobol, supra note 7 at 1137.
22. 544 F. Supp. 49 (W.D. Pa. 1982).
23. 544 F. Supp. at 51.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. 556 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Pa. 1982).
27. Id. at 438.
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all fraud limitation period was most appropriate. 28
The Pennsylvania state legislature had enacted new statutes of limi-
tation for a number of actions in the late 1970's.29 The federal district
court was forced to predict which limitation period was most appropri-
ate because the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania had not yet decided the
issue.3 0 The court found the two-year period applicable but indicated
that the jury was to determine when the plaintiffs had knowledge of the
fraud and whether the limitation period had tolled.
3 1
These cases illustrate the disparity and confusion created by the
lack of a standard limitation period for Rule lOb-5 actions in a single
state. Legislatively enacted statutes of limitation, on the state level, can
change at the whim of the General Assembly and generally lack consis-
tency with the purpose of the federal securities laws.3 2 The problem
became magnified when a circuit chose among different causes of action
within each state,3 3 or the parties involved in the action were within dif-
ferent circuits' jurisdiction.3 4 Defendants and plaintiffs had no basis for
determining whether a cause of action had tolled, thereby forstalling the
suit. Federal securities actions became further complicated when the se-
curities solicitation occurred telephonically because it raised complex
choice of law questions.3 5
This disparity lead to inequities against defendants and may also
have harmed unwary plaintiffs who inappropriately worded complaints
by stating claims that would render the adoption of a shorter limitation
period. Attempts by the circuits to impose some sense of certainty on
Rule lOb-5 actions fell short of providing the uniformity necessary for





31. Id. at 440.
32. Within the Tenth Circuit the limitations period for fraud varies. Colorado, three
years, see CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-80-101 (1989); Kansas, two years upon discovery, see KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-513 (1983); New Mexico, four years, see N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-4 (Michie
1990); Oklahoma, two years upon discovery, see OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12 § 95 (West 1988);
Utah, three years upon discovery, see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26 (1990); Wyoming, four
years upon discovery, see Wyo. STAT. § 1-3-105 (1988).
33. State legislatures are prolific in their adoption of statutes of limitations for varying
causes of action. Colorado alone has well over twenty-five statutes of limitations ranging
from COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102, applying a two-year limitation period for claims under
absolute liability to § 8-4-126, C.R.S., providing a two-year statute of limitations for wage
disputes.
34. For a case dealing with a rule lOb-5 action with parties in different circuits, see
Ceres Partners v. Gel Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
35. This is especially true with rule lOb-5 actions. The choice of law questions
abound because of the preponderance of diversity citizenship suits; however, these are not
within the scope of this Article.
36. In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc),
ceri. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988); Ceres Partners v. Gel Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990)
(applying an analogous federal statute of limitations); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co.,
908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990) (applying an analogous federal statute of limitations), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991).
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C. Adoption of an Analogous Federal Limitation Period
The Court has repeatedly stated that when Congress does not pro-
vide an express limitation period, it intends the adoption of a statute of
limitations from a state-borrowed cause of action.3 7 This principle is
premised upon years of Court precedent and the Rules of Decision
Act.3 8 The state-borrowing doctrine may not be lightly abandoned be-
cause of congressional reliance. The Court has on a number of occa-
sions, and particularly more recently, limited the choice of adoptable
state actions, or simply adopted a limitation period from an analogous
federal statute.
In Del Costello v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters,39 the issue cen-
tered upon what limitation period would govern an employee's claim
both against his employer for breach of a collective bargaining agree-
ment and against his union for breach of duty of fair representation. 4
0
The claims were brought under different theories, including a contract
claim against the employer and an arbitrator/bad faith claim against the
union.4 1 Recognizing the inherent inconsistency of both claims, the
Court adopted the six-month limitation period prescribed under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act (NLRA).42 In searching for an equitable limi-
tation period, the Court found Maryland's one-year limitation period for
breach of contract too long and thus inequitable to the defendant. The
state's limitation period for vacating an arbitration award was consid-
ered too short to allow a plaintiff to reasonably assess the claim. 43 The
Court determined the six-month period provided by the NLRA section
10(b) addressed the unique nature of employee/union disputes. 44 In
citing prior decisions, 45 the Court found that Congress's specific intent
was to balance national interests against individual rights when estab-
lishing the NLRA limitation period.4 6 This balancing of interests, to-
gether with the intrinsic inconsistency of the claims, led to the rejection
of a state-created analogy and the adoption of a federal statute's limita-
tion period.
The Court has repeatedly stated that when a lower court chooses a
statute of limitation, it should do so in a straightforward matter. In Wil-
son v. Garcia,4 7 the Court determined the proper limitation period for
bringing a Section 1983 civil rights claim. The majority recognized that
37. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 266-267 (1985); Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S.
610, 617 (1895).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 52 (1990).
39. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
40. Id. at 156.
41. Id. at 164.
42. 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1989).
43. 462 U.S. at 166.
44. See id. at 167-72. Six months would provide the employee with enough time to
bring suit and also would be short enough to promote the federal policy of rapid final
resolution of labor disputes.
45. See United Parcel Serv., Inc. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56 (1981).
46. 462 U.S. at 171.
47. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
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a Section 1983 cause of action could be raised under differing legal the-
ories, and a plaintiff could allege a number of different limitation peri-
ods.4 8 The Court stated that Congress, in enacting the legislation,
could not have intended such inconsistency in the enforcement of civil
liberties.4 9 The Court enumerated a three-part test for determining the
most analogous state statute from which to borrow a limitation period.
First, a court must decide whether state or federal law governs the char-
acterization of the claim.50 Second, if a federal characterization applies,
the court must determine if all similar claims should be viewed in the
same light or viewed differently depending on the circumstances. 5 1 Fi-
nally, the court must characterize the claim to establish which statute
provides the "most appropriate limiting principle."
'52
In applying the test, the Wilson Court determined that Section 1983
provided "a uniquely federal remedy" against impediments of state law
on civil liberties. 53 The majority reasoned that Section 1983 may "en-
compass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics" within each
claim. 54 The Court acknowledged that while national uniformity in such
actions was preferred, such consistency was not necessary, 55 and held
that a Section 1983 limitation period must be consistently derived from
the same state-based action within each state.
5 6
In Agency Holding, Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Associates, Inc.,57 the Court
decided the appropriate limitations period for a private action brought
under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO).58 In Agency, an insurance agency alleged fraud and civil con-
spiracy three years after the alleged violative acts occurred. The district
court held the claims were barred after applying a state-borrowed two-
year fraud statute of limitations. The Third Circuit reversed, finding the
state's six-year "catchall" statute the most appropriate. The Supreme
Court, however, held a federal statute, the Clayton Act,5 9 most analo-
gous for adopting a statue of limitations.
In Agency, the majority found that a uniform federal limitation pe-
riod better fulfills congressional intent because RICO claims embrace
diverse local jurisprudential concepts. These legal concepts encompass
"enterprise and pattern of racketeering activity" that do not conve-
niently fit into state-based common law statutory schemes.60 The Court
adopted the limitation period provided by the Clayton Act because both
48. Id. at 273-74.
49. See id. at 268-69.
50. Id. at 268.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 271-72.
54. Id. at 273.
55. Id. at 275.
56. Id. at 279. The statute of limitations for a personal injury was chosen as the ap-
propriate limitation period for a Section 1983 cause of action arising in New Mexico.
57. 18 U.S.C. § 1961-68 (1989).
58. 483 U.S. 143 (1988).
59. 15 U.S.C. § 15(b), 18 U.S.C. § 1964.
60. 483 U.S. at 150.
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the RICO and Clayton acts were structured to compensate for similar
injuries and provide similar remedies. 6 1 Moreover, the possibility ex-
isted that a state's limitation period was too short.62
Del Costello and Agency Holding, Inc. hold that courts must adopt a
federal limitation period when state limitation periods compromise con-
gressional intent or fail to provide a reasonable time in which to bring
an action. This determination must be made through an application of
the three-part test enumerated in Wilson. The Court's repeated applica-
tion and recognition of the state-borrowing method evidences a sub-
stantial presumption favoring state-borrowing.
The Supreme Court repeatedly denied certiorari in cases present-
ing a similar question as applied to Rule lOb-5. 63 Without guidance, a
number of federal circuits began adopting limitation periods from
analogous federal statutes in an effort to provide consistency to a preju-
dicial and chaotic situation.
D. Rule lOb-5 and the Circuit Courts
The increasing growth in the number of lOb-5 claims placed a sig-
nificant burden on the federal courts. Rule lOb-5 was the federal securi-
ties regulation most often used by investors seeking remedy for a
fraudulent act. The traditional state-borrowing method for selecting an
appropriate limitation period proved burdensome, unpredictable and,
quite often, inequitable. After almost forty years of adopting limitation
periods ranging from one to ten years, several circuits began adopting a
uniform circuit-wide limitation period.
In In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation,64 the Third Circuit, in
an en banc decision, adopted a uniform, circuit-wide limitations period
from an analogous federal securities statute. Prior to Data Access, the
Third Circuit had applied a state's Blue Sky limitation period, unless
that statute failed to provide the remedy sought by the plaintiff. In the
latter instance, the court then would apply the limitation period of a
state action most analogous to the claimed relief.
The Data Access plaintiffs argued for application of the New Jersey
statute of limitations for common law fraud. 6 5 The Third Circuit re-
jected the common law fraud analysis, noting the lower threshold of
proof needed in a Rule lOb-5 claim.6 6 Rather than look to the usual
alternative (the state Blue Sky statute), the court opted for a federal so-
61. Id. at 151.
62. Id. at 154.
63. In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation, 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
488 U.S. 849 (1988); Nortek, Inc. v. Alexander Grant and Company, 532 F.2d 1013 (5th
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1042 (1977).
64. 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988) (adopting limi-
tation periods from the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, codified as amended at, 15
U.S.C. §§ 9(e), 18(c) and 29(b) (1988)).
65. Id. at 1538.
66. Id. at 1544.
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lution. The Third Circuit concluded that language in Del Costello 67 and
Agency Holding6 8 authorized a retreat from the practice of state-borrow-
ing.6 9 In Del Costello, the Court adopted a limitation period from an
analogous federal statute because state law provided an insufficient pe-
riod. The Agency Holding Corp. decision rejected borrowing a state-cre-
ated action because a common law action and RICO could not easily be
compared or reconciled. In both decisions the Supreme Court, not find-
ing a better analogous state source, adopted a limitation period from a
federal statute.
The Third Circuit examined the problems arising out of the tradi-
tional practice of adopting state-borrowed limitation periods:
70
We are required to examine each contention of a federal secur-
ities complaint with great particularity to determine whether
the state blue sky statute tracks the particular federal claim, and
if not, to determine claim by claim which other state limitations
period will apply depending upon the resemblance between the
precise federal claim and those based in state or common law
actions.
7 '
The majority recognized that the traditional practice did not pro-
vide any "bright-line guidance" on the problem7 2 and instead found
that "[a] factual, claim-based approach to characterizing the case for lim-
itations purposes would not promote [federal interests]." 7 3 The court
reasoned that Congress intended to provide national and uniform reme-
dies to fill a void in the common law. Using the analogy of the country
as a "commercial universe," the court found state-based actions too di-
verse to accomplish the uniformity necessary to promote economic
goals.
74
In rejecting the adoption of a state action, the Third Circuit relied
on Supreme Court dictum construing lOb-5 suits as not substantially
analogous to fraud or deceit claims. 75 The majority found that section
10(b), companion sections 9(e), 18(c) and 29(b) of the 1934 Act and
sections 12 and 13 of the 1933 Act accomplished the same objectives-
provide full disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate
commerce and prevent fraud.7 6 The court held these sections most
analogous. With each section having a similar limitations period, 77 the
court reasoned that "[w]hen Congress has created a right to sue in se-
67. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
68. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
69. 843 F.2d at 1540.
70. The court, in reexamining its Biggans v. Bache Halsey Stuart Shields, Inc., 638
F.2d 605 (3d Cir. 1980) decision, illustrates the problem arising out of a single 1Ob-5 claim
of action within a single state and the disparity between the state's applicable statutes of
limitation. 843"F.2d at 1541.
71. 843 F.2d at 1541.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 1543.
74. Id. at 1548-49.
75. 843 F.2d at 1545 (citing Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 245 n.22 (1988)).
76. 843 F.2d at 1548.
77. Id.
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curities matters, it has, with one exception, declared a limitations period
no longer than three years."
7 8
Following the Data Access decision, two other circuits adopted a simi-
lar approach. The Seventh Circuit adopted the one-year/three-year lim-
itation period in Short v. Belleville Shoe Manufacturing Co. 79 After finding a
uniform limitation period should apply to all Rule lOb-5 claims, the
court focused on whether to adopt a limitation period from section 13 of
the 1934 Act or the more recently enacted section 20A.80 The majority
concluded that section 13 had a more general application and was better
suited for the wide variety of claims brought under Rule lOb-5. How-
ever, after reviewing a SEC amicus brief in a prior case,8 1 the court
found section 20A's five-year limitation period appealing. It reasoned
the longer period may have been more reflective of Congress's most
recent intent in enacting securities laws. 8 2 The five-year period of sec-
tion 20A was rejected because of the prior adoption of section 13 by the
Third Circuit and the court's paramount concern for national
uniformity.
The Second Circuit, in Ceres Partners v. GEL Associates,83 also adopted
the one-year/three-year limitation period. The court relied heavily on
Data Access because the plaintiff resided in the Third Circuit and the de-
fendant in the Second. After considering section 20A, the court
adopted the section 13 limitation period because of the great emphasis
placed on the need for uniformity.
III. INSTANT CASE
With three circuits utilizing a single, uniform limitations period and
all other circuits continuing the state-borrowing practice, the issue was
ripe for United States Supreme Court treatment. The Court addressed
the issue in Lampf v. Gilbertson.8 4 In Lampf, the purchasers of shares in
several failed limited partnerships brought suit against the law firm that
prepared tax memoranda allegedly relied upon by the investors.8 5 The
investors claimed the law firm violated Rule lOb-5 by making misrepre-
sentations that induced their investment. The district court granted
summary judgment for the defendants, finding the claim barred by Ore-
gon's two-year limitation period for fraud. 8 6
78. Id. at 1550. Three judges dissented; however, the discussion focused on the ma-
jority's failure to address the question of retroactivity. The dissent found, after applying
the three part test from Chevron Oil Co., 404 U.S. 97 (1971), that the majority's holding
should not apply to the case at hand. 843 F.2d at 1553.
79. 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990).
80. The statute of limitations for section 20(a) states: No action may be brought
under this section more than five years after the date of the last transaction that is the
subject of the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 78t-1(b)(4) (1990).
81. Brief for the United States, Lebman v. Aktiebolaget Electrolux, cert. denied, 109 S.
Ct. 3214 (1989) (No. 88-1114).
82. 908 F.2d at 1391.
83. 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
84. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
85. Id. at 2776.
86. Id. at 2777 (District Court decision is an unpublished opinion).
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On review, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding
that a question of material fact existed precluding summary judgment.
In reversing, the court expressly rejected the defendant's claim that a
federal limitation period should apply. The Supreme Court granted cer-
tiorari, citing the "divergence of opinion among the circuits regarding
the proper limitations period."
8 7
A. Majority Opinion
In adopting the one-year/three-year limitations period from the
1934 Act, the majority reiterated that a court's decision on the appropri-
ate limitations period should be clear and straightforward.8 8 Justice
Blackmun, writing for the majority, enumerated a three-step, Wilson-like
test for determining the appropriate limitation period when one is not
expressly provided.8 9 First, the court must determine the need for a
uniform limitation period. When a federal cause of action can arise
under different legal theories, the court should bow to predictability and
judicial economy, and err on the side of uniformity. 90
Second, the court should decide whether a state or federal source
should provide the foundation for the limitation period. The majority
specifically noted the geographic character of the claim as warranting
additional consideration. When a claim can be multi-state in character,
a federal limitations period is preferred to prevent forum shopping and
to simplify the lower court's task.9 1 Finally, any federal analogy must
provide a "closer fit" to the litigated claim than is afforded by state bor-
rowed sources.
92
In applying this test, a need for a uniform limitation period for Rule
10(b)-5 claims was evident. The majority found that a national, uniform
statute of limitations would both serve congressional intent and provide
judicial economy. In assessing whether to look to a state or federal
foundation, the Court rejected an assertion that state-based fraud stat-
utes provided the closest analogy because Congress had expressly ar-
ticulated several similar limitation periods in the same enactment.
9 3
These federal limitation periods recognize the expansive geographic
character of Rule lOb-5 claims and shift the presumption to using a fed-
eral source. In rejecting the SEC's claim that a five-year statute of re-
pose is more representative of congressional intent, the Court found
that the express limitation periods from the 1934 Act provided the clear-
est evidence of such intentions at the time of enactment of section
10b.
9 4
Finally, the majority rejected any application of the doctrine of eq-
87. Id.





93. Id. at 2780.
94. Id. at 2780.
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uitable estoppel to the new limitation period. It held the three-year
component acted as a statute of repose, and application of the doctrine
would be contradictory to the intent of the legislation. 95 The majority
then found the investor's claims were time barred. In a terse concur-




Justice Stevens, in a dissent joined by Justice Souter, echoed the
concerns ofJustice Scalia in recognizing the need for Congress to articu-
late limitation periods. In citing four decades of precedent and Con-
gress's awareness of the state-borrowing doctrine, Justice Stevens
argued that the Court had both made policy and possibly overstepped
its constitutional bounds.9 7 The dissent disagreed with the majority's
reliance on Agency Holding Corp., stating that RICO actions are relatively
new and the adoption of a federal analogy (the Clayton Act) did not
reverse forty years of precedent. 98
Both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy authored concurring dis-
sents. Justice O'Connor focused on the majority's retroactive applica-
tion of the decision. 9 9 She observed that the claims were time barred
because the plaintiffs were "unable to predict the future."' 0 0 Citing
Chevron Oil Company v. Hulson 101 as an example, Justice O'Connor stated
that plaintiffs should be harmed for "sleeping on their rights," and not
for relying on long established precedent.'
0 2
Relying on Chevron Oil Company, Justice O'Connor applied a three
element test for determining whether a new decision may properly be
applied retroactively. First, the decision must establish a new principle
of law overriding clear past precedent relied on by the litigants.10 3 Sec-
ond, the Court must determine whether the retroactive application of a
new decision will advance or retard the purpose and operation of the
law. 10 4 Finally, the Court must establish that a retroactive application of
its decision will not produce "substantial inequitable results."' 0 5 In
Lampf, the Court clearly disregarded the Chevron test. First, the Court
overruled clearly established precedent. Second, while predictability is
desirable in the future, it cannot be applied to the past. Finally, the ma-
jority's action was highly inequitable to the plaintiffs, who had litigated
this issue for over four years. 10 6 Justice O'Connor believed that such
95. Id. at 2781.
96. Id. at 2783.
97. Id. at 2784 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
98. Id. at 2785.
99. Id. at 2785 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
100. Id. at 2786.
101. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
102. 111 S. Ct. at2786.
103. 404 U.S. at 106.
104. Id. at 107.
105. Id.
106. 111 S. Ct. at 2787.
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action by the majority went against earlier precedent, holding that appli-
cation of a retroactive limitation period violates due process..
0 7
Justice Kennedy's dissent focused on the three-year statute of re-
pose adopted by the majority. Since Rule 1Ob-5 was aimed at fraudulent
actions, he found the three-year period was contradictory to the intent
of the rule.1 08 Justice Kennedy reasoned that each "analogous" cause
of action borrowed by the majority was fundamentally different from
Rule lOb-5's anti-fraud character.10 9 He recognized the limitation peri-
ods expressed in the 1934 Act may not be the most analogous to Rule
lOb-5 claims.
This dissent noted the burden a plaintiff has in a fraud claim and
that concealment is an inherent characteristic because of the very nature
of fraud.1 0 Noting that short statutes of repose are repugnant to fraud-
based actions, Justice Kennedy believed that the majority's three-year
repose period "simply tips the scale too far in favor of wrongdoers.""'
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court's decision in Lampf evidences a common sense
approach to a complicated statute of limitations problem. There are,
however, areas in the majority's opinion that are inconsistent with prece-
dent and demonstrate faulty logic. Specifically, the Court's actions evi-
dence a trend rejecting the practice of state-borrowing and the
federalization of certain common-law doctrines within the federal court
system. The Court's cursory application of its own three-part test and
the silent retroactive application of the decision go against the grain of
justice and equity.
A. Application of "Statute Selection" Test
The majority's superficial application of its "statute selection" test
to the Rule 1Ob-5 limitations problem produced the desired uniformity,
but sacrificed law based upon thoroughly reasoned progressions. In
choosing an appropriate limitations period in any particular Federal Dis-
trict or Circuit, it is abundantly clear that inconsistencies arise because
of Rule 1Ob-5's diverse application. This broad application presents a
cornucopia of legal theories and ancillary limitation periods to choose
from because remedies for securities fraud can encompass tort or con-
tract theories. The Court correctly determined that there was a need for
a uniform statute of limitations for all 1Ob-5 actions, citing predictability
and judicial economy as the main reasons.
Recognizing that a uniform limitation period can be applied on a
state or national level, the majority next looked to the geographic char-
acter of the claim. Any survey of Rule 1Ob-5 claims clearly demonstrates
107. Id. at 2786.
108. Id. at 2790 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 2789.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 2790.
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the complexity and geographic diversity of such causes of action. This
was readily evident in Ceres Partners,1 12 where the opposing parties re-
sided in different circuits that utilized different limitation periods. The
majority also recognized the threat of forum shopping and the general
complexity of a Rule lOb-5 limitation ruling.
The analysis runs into trouble when the Court seeks a "closer fit"
from a federal statute. It should be noted that the presumption rests on
choosing a state-borrowed limitation period and that this presump-
tion, 1 13 based on forty years of precedent, can only be overcome by a
statute that is clearly more relevant and more properly tailored to the
intent of Congress.
The Court concludes that other sections of the 1934 Act provide a
"closer fit" for Rule lOb-5 actions because section 10(b) was enacted
along with these other provisions. 114 The Court cites Del Costello as sup-
port for its assumption that a federal analogy is preferred. 115 The
Court's reliance on Del Costello rests on a weak foundation. Del Costello
dealt with claims that were commonly brought simultaneously between
employee and employer, and employee and union, but under two dis-
tinct legal theories, including breach of contract and breach of duty."
16
In Del Costello the Court faced diversionary claims, which by their very
nature gave rise to contradicting limitation periods when using the state-
borrowing method. This inherent contradiction made it necessary for
the Court to find a third, federal-based source for an equitable statute of
limitations.
The Lampf Court's determination that the expressed limitations pe-
riod provided in other sections of the 1934 Act is Congress's clearest
intent is based on an assumption that the other sections remedy similar
injustices and therefore related to section 10(b). This assumption is a
long, logical leap because the majority does not point toward a particu-
lar statute section as it did in Malley-Duff. 1 17 There, the limitations pe-
riod from the Clayton Act was applied to a RICO cause of action. The
Lampf Court simply asserts that since the 1934 Act is directed, like Rule
lOb-5, at securities improprieties, both statutory sections are clearly
analogous. 18
Justice Kennedy points out that these "analogous" sections articu-
late purposes other than those of Rule lOb-5. Section 78(i) prohibits
acts of manipulation of security prices. The section specifically deals
with misrepresentations of active trading, price fixing or violation of the
rules and regulations of the Securities Commission. Section 7 8(g) pro-
hibits misleading or false statements in general. These two sections deal
112. 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
113. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2778.
114. Id. at 2781.
115. Id. at 2780.
116. Del Costello, 462 U.S. at 164.
117. Malley-Duff, 483 U.S. at 150 (citing the Clayton Act, 38 Stat. 731, as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1990)).
118. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780-81.
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with specific acts which, because of their narrow scope, may justifiably
give rise to a one-year/three-year statute of limitations. Conversely,
Rule lOb-5 and section 10(b) generally apply to any fraudulent securi-
ties transaction. The Supreme Court has held that under a lOb-5 claim
a plaintiff must prove the elements of common law fraud, particularly
scienter 1 19 Additionally, Rule 1Ob-5's wide acceptance and use as a liti-
gative tool provides evidence of its special status among securities law
remedies available to an investor/plaintiff.
The very nature of fraud makes its discovery difficult. In contrast, it
is substantively easier to trace a misleading statement or a price fixing
scheme, particularly when a national securities trading board is involved
in the monitoring and regulation of such transactions. It is clear that the
Court's apparent acquiescence of the 1934 Act as a "closer fit" is built
upon shaky ground. The Court states that the goal of securities laws is
to protect investors against the manipulation of stock prices through
regulation of securities transactions and exchanges. However, rule lOb-
5 has been applied to a vastly wider scope of dealings, including sales of
units in limited and general partnerships, activities not highly regulated.
Based on the Court's own presumption that state-borrowing is the
appropriate method for selecting a statute of limitations when none is
expressly provided, the Court failed to overcome that presumption and
the Court's federal analogy should not stand. A good faith application
of the Court's three-part test would have accorded the adoption of a
longer limitation period. The five-year period enacted through the In-
sider Trading Act, as suggested by the SEC, would have provided con-
tinuity between each jurisdiction. Insider trading and fraud share
common characteristics, such as difficulty of discovery. The five-year
limitation period would both promote congressional intent and not un-
dermine the principle use of Rule lOb-5, i.e., halting general securities
fraud.
B. Retroactivity
The majority's decision to adopt a uniform, national statute of limi-
tations for Rule lOb-5 actions is in accordance with virtually every com-
mentator who has written on the subject. However, the Court's
retroactive application of the limitation period is deplorable. As noted
injustice O'Connor's dissent, "the court shuts the courthouse door on
respondents because they were unable to predict the future."' 20 There
can be'very little "analysis" of the majority's retroactive application of
the holding because the Court simply states that the plaintiff's actions
are time barred. 12 1 No legal justification, based on case law or statute, is
provided to support this ruling.
Such ruling by the Court goes against the grain of precedent, which
consistently holds that when there is a drastic change in a well estab-
119. Ernst and Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
120. 111 S. Ct. at 2786.
121. Id. at 2782.
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lished law, especially a limitation period, it is inequitable to apply the
new law retroactively.1 22 In Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, the Court ar-
ticulated a test for determining whether a judicial decision should be
retroactively applied.1 2 3 In Chevron, the Court was faced with a statute
of limitations problem focusing particularly on a cause of action for per-
sonal injuries under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act. Congress
had enacted a statute providing for federal rights and federal claims but
failed to express a limitation period for such actions. The Court found
that Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations for personal injury was
the "closest fit." A retroactive application of the new limitation period
would have barred the plaintiff's cause of action.
The Court articulated three separate factors for determining the
retroactivity question. 124 These factors are: (1) whether there is estab-
lished a new rule and overriding clear precedent; (2) whether retroactiv-
ity will retard the rule's purpose; and (3) whether retroactivity will
produce "substantial inequitable results." In Chevron, the Court deter-
mined the statute of limitation should not be applied retroactively in
that particular case. If the Chevron test is applied to the Lampf decision, it
becomes clear that the new Rule lOb-5 statute of limitation should not
be applied retroactively.
First, the Court's decision to apply the new limitations period to
1Ob-5 actions overrules clear precedent in the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals, which, prior to Lampf, applied a limitation period by borrowing
from the relevant state fraud claim.12 5 Additionally, prior to the Lampf
decision only three Circuits had determined that there was a clear fed-
eral analogy to lOb-5 actions. The first of these Circuits did not adopt
the federal analogy rule until 1988. In fact it was only in the last three of
Rule 1Ob-5's forty years of private use in civil litigation that the concept
of federal analogy had even been adopted by the federal judiciary. It
should be noted that the Lampf plaintiffs brought their action in 1986,
two years prior to any Circuit's adoption of the federal analogy. It is
readily apparent that the Lampf plaintiffs have fulfilled the first factor in
the Chevron test. The Court overruled precedent on which the litigants
had relied.
Second, in looking to the effect of this decision on Rule lOb-5, it is
obvious that the application of a particular statute of limitations has a
great effect on Rule lOb-5's use. Rule lOb-5 provides investors with a
federal cause of action arising out of any fraudulent transaction.dealing
with securities. By applying such a short limitation period, the purpose
of Rule 1Ob-5 will be greatly retarded. Now, as in Lampf, fraudulent ac-
tions must be discovered within three years. The retroactive application
of the Court's decision on the Lampf plaintiffs is disastrous because the
122. See St. Francis College v. A-Khazrhai, 481 U.S. 604, 608-09 (1987); Chevron Oil
Co., 404 U.S. at 97; Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55 (1902).
123. 404 U.S. at 106-07 (1971).
124. See supra note 101.
125. Lampf, II1 S. Ct. at 2785.
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cause of action was not filed within the three-year statute of repose and
therefore, the claims were barred. This is an onerous result after five
years of litigation and reliance on well established precedent both in the
Ninth Circuit and throughout the United States.
The third factor of the Chevron test, substantial inequity, is clearly
met. The Court's determination to apply the new limitation period ret-
roactively completely eliminated the plaintiffs' hopes for a successful liti-
gative outcome and caused great injustice and substantial hardship
which could have been avoided by not applying the decision retroac-
tively. The Court's failure to follow Chevron in its decision not only
harmed the plaintiffs but cast doubt on the Court's intellectual integrity.
Aggrieved parties have no way of determining which precedent the
Court will choose to apply or reject in any particular case.
V. CONCLUSION
No one argues with the Court's determination that claims brought
under Rule 10b-5 are complex and diverse enough to warrant a uniform,
national statue of limitations. The inequities placed on both the plaintiff
and defendant are readily apparent through a reading of district or ap-
pellate opinions applying different statutes of limitations from different
state-borrowed causes of actions. The majority's haste to bring order to
this chaos has, however, missed an opportunity to make a well educated
decision rather than a mere determination of law. The Court's adoption
of the one-year/three-year statute of limitations from the 1934 Act may
be judicially prudent but such a decision falls short of the Court's pur-
pose. The Court, according to its own precedent, had a duty to find the
"closest fit" for a Rule lOb-5 claim, not just the simplistic task of finding
a justifiable alternative to the state-borrowing method. In rejecting the
SEC's argument, which promoted the adoption of the five-year period of
section 20(A), the Court failed to produce a uniform limitation period
which would also advance Rule lOb-5's purpose of remedying fraudu-
lent transactions. At the time of this writing, there is already a move-
ment afoot in Congress to legislate a five-year statute of repose for Rule
lOb-5.
While the Court's adoption of the one-year/three-year limitation
may be defenseable, its retroactive application of this newly determined
statute of limitations borders on a violation of a plaintiff's right to due
process. To retroactively apply a law, after plaintiffs had spent an enor-
mous amount of time and money relying on established precedent, went
against all precepts of justice and equality. To apply the statute of limi-
tations retroactively without a hint of justification or legal rationale is
simply a slap in the face of any individual relying on any precedent, in
any court. The injustice of the Court's retroactive application has far
reaching ramifications. Lower courts will now retroactively apply the
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new limitation period to bar unwitting plaintiffs.1 2 6 The Court's deci-
sion merely to pass judgment and apply that ruling without any articu-
lated reason diminishes respect for the Court and makes the legal
community wonder whether, in the future, decisions will be founded on
a rational extension of past precedent or merely the current whims of
the judiciary.
Joseph Cachey III
126. See Lewis v. Hermann, No. 89 C 04576, 1991 WL 199627 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 17,
1991); Welch v. Cadre Capital, 923 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1991).
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